

Sichere Software vom Java-Entwickler

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Java Forum Stuttgart
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
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“We can no longer afford to tolerate relatively simple security problems like those presented in the OWASP Top 10.”

— OWASP

Secure software is not developed accidentally

- Applications must be protected from the beginning
 - Security fix does not bring back stolen data
 - Problem may be caused by the architecture
- 100% secure software will never exist
 - But we can stop making it that easy for attackers




Open **W**eb **A**pplication **S**ecurity **P**roject (OWASP)

Improving the security of (web) application software

- ▶ Not-for-profit organization since 2001
- ▶ Raise interest in secure development




- ▶ Top 10
- ▶ Cheat Sheets
- ▶ Development Guides
- ▶ ...



- ▶ Enterprise Security API (ESAPI)
- ▶ WebScarab
- ▶ WebGoat
- ▶ ...



Injection



- The famous (and least necessary) **SQL injection**

- Simple to avoid with **prepared statements**

- Use OR-Mapper like Hibernate or Spring JdbcTemplate
 - Use it correctly

```
String query = "Select * from users where user_id = '" + userId + "'";  
PreparedStatement pstmt = con.prepareStatement(query);  
ResultSet rs = pstmt.executeQuery();
```

- Limit database user permissions

- **Other injections** (like LDAP injection, XPath injection)

- **White list validation** for all user supplied input

Security Misconfiguration

Some other guys job

- Server/ database configuration, firewall, user rights
 - Disable unnecessary features, services, ports, ...

Developer's job

- Configure logging/ exception handling
 - No technical errors in frontend
 - Never serve log over web application in production environment
- Framework security configuration
 - Security updates, new versions

Insecure Cryptographic Storage

Most of the time, the problem is not the algorithm


- Data isn't protected at all
 - Identify and protect all sensitive data in all places
 - Never log any sensitive data (unencrypted)
- Real threats not identified
 - DB encryption protects data from DBA/ stolen disks, not SQL injection
- Use standards, never invent your own *,algorithm'*
- Prepare key exchange and revocation
 - Change keys periodically

Failure to Restrict URL Access



Think about roles from the beginning

- ▶ Store view files (JSP, JSF, ...) in different folders based on roles
- ▶ Makes filter configuration much easier



Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

Redirects send request to new external page

- ▶ **Target:** Phishing, pharming, malware installation

Forwards send request to new page in same application

- ▶ **Target:** Bypass authentication/ authorization checks

Avoid redirects and forwards wherever possible

Don't allow user parameters in target URL

User parameters in target URL required



Validate final URL



Call access controller



Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Execute code in victim's browser
 - Steal user session, sensitive user data, ...
 - Redirect to phishing sites, malware installation, ...
- Different XSS types
 - Stored
 - Reflected 
 - DOM based

Often because of missing input validation

```

```

```
<input type="image" src="javascript:alert('XSS');">
```

```
<body onload=alert('XSS')>
```

```
<b onmouseover=alert('XSS')>click me!</b>
```

Input validation and output escaping for every input

- Input **validate** with a white list

- Output **escape**

- JSF implicitly escapes output

```
<h:outputText value="#{user.firstname" escape="false" />
```

- ESAPI.encoder() provides different encoding methods

```
private void escapeOutput() {  
    String input = "<script>alert(12345)</script>";  
  
    String safeOutput = ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTML(input);  
    // &lt;script&gt;alert(12345)&lt;&#x2F;script&gt;  
  
    safeOutput = ESAPI.encoder().encodeForJavaScript(input);  
    // \x3Cscript\x3Ealert\x2812345\x29\x3C\x2Fscript\x3E  
}
```

Prevent scripts from accessing cookie with http-only

```
<cookie-config>  
  <!-- block script access to cookie -->  
  <http-only>true</http-only>  
  <!-- protect cookie transport -->  
  <secure>true</secure>  
</cookie-config>
```

Broken Authentication and Session Management

One of the most complicated parts to develop

Simply: Don't invent it again, use existing frameworks

- ▶ Spring Security <http://www.springsource.org/spring-security>
- ▶ Apache Shiro <http://shiro.apache.org>

Centralize: One library, one place

- ▶ Independent of authentication system (LDAP, AD, DB, ...)
- ▶ Know exactly how to use it

*But: HTTP is a stateless protocol →
credentials (session id) are included in every request*

Protect all connections with authentication data with SSL/TLS


- Session id and credentials must be protected at all times
 - As valuable as username and password
 - Unprotected connection exposes session id
- ▶ Don't include session information (like session id) in URLs



@

Google





```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<web-app xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee" xmlns:web="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee"
  xsi:schemaLocation="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee/web-app_3_0.xsd"
  id="WebXMLParameters" version="3.0">
  <display-name>WebXMLParameters</display-name>

  <session-config>
    <!-- soft session timeout -->
    <session-timeout>30</session-timeout>

    <cookie-config>
      <!-- block script access to cookie -->
      <http-only>true</http-only>
      <!-- protect cookie transport -->
      <secure>true</secure>
    </cookie-config>

    <!-- store JSESSIONID in cookie -->
    <tracking-mode>COOKIE</tracking-mode>
  </session-config>
</web-app>
```

Design Source

Insecure Direct Object References




1. User logs in with username/ password
URL is `https://www.fakesite.com/account?no=123456789`
2. User experiments with URL *no* parameter
URL is `https://www.fakesite.com/account?no=987654321`
3. User can view/ change other accounts

```
private Set<Object> accounts;  
private Account accountA = new Account(111111111);  
private Account accountB = new Account(222222222);  
private Account accountC = new Account(333333333);  
private Account accountD = new Account(444444444);
```

```
public AccountService() {  
    accounts = new HashSet<Object>();  
    accounts.add(accountA);  
    // add all accounts  
}
```


```
public void accessMap() throws AccessControlException {  
    IntegerAccessReferenceMap map = new IntegerAccessReferenceMap(accounts);  
    String indRef = map.getIndirectReference(accountB);  
    System.out.println("Ref " + indRef);  
  
    String mapRef = indRef; // e.g. accessed via request parameter  
    Account account = (Account) map.getDirectReference(mapRef);  
    System.out.println("No " + account.getNo());  
}
```



```
private Set<Object> accounts;  
private Account accountA = new Account(111111111);  
private Account accountB = new Account(222222222);  
private Account accountC = new Account(333333333);  
private Account accountD = new Account(444444444);
```

```
public AccountService() {  
    accounts = new HashSet<Object>();  
    accounts.add(accountA);  
    // add all accounts  
}
```

```
public void accessRandomMap() throws AccessControlException {  
    RandomAccessReferenceMap map = new RandomAccessReferenceMap(accounts);  
    String indRef = map.getIndirectReference(accountA);  
    System.out.println("Ref " + indRef);  
  
    String mapRef = indRef; // e.g. accessed via request parameter  
    Account account = (Account) map.getDirectReference(mapRef);  
    System.out.println("No " + account.getNo());  
}
```



Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- Browser **with authenticated user** must send credentials
 - Attacker causes request from his site to vulnerable application
 - e.g. with an invisible or <iframe>
 - User's credentials are used to execute attacker's request
- Often a vulnerable (standard) intranet application
 - Not accessible externally
 - Victim's browser inside corporate network is tricked into issuing commands



<SCRIPT>

Calculate a random secret token

- **Calculate a random secret token** at beginning of session
 - Calculate per request for higher security needs
 - Value not automatically submitted like session cookie
- **Add** this token as hidden field to **all** (critical) **forms**

```
<input type="hidden" name="csrfToken" value="928ce83948da9389eb9384019c38de8c" />
```

- **Check** token before executing selected action

Create your own secure form

- Create own form like ***SecureForm***
 - Adds token automatically
 - Easy (re)usable by developers
- Standard unprotected form still available

Configure session timeout in web.xml

```
<session-config>  
    <session-timeout>60</session-timeout>  
</session-config>
```

Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

Correct SSL/TLS configuration is difficult

- ▶ Web-/application server administrator
 - Identify all routes where sensitive data is broadcasted
 - Protect all *(or nothing)*
 - Don't mix protected with unprotected content
 - Secure the input form for log-in credentials
 - Secure the session cookie
- less vulnerable
for Man-in-
the-Middle
attacks*

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is currently an IETF draft

```
HttpServletResponse response ...;  
response.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security",  
    "max-age=8640000; includeSubdomains");
```

- Application forces browser to only use HTTPS when visiting
 - For specified time, renewed with every response
- Access blocked if communication is insecure
 - Invalid certificate --> error page (not strange warning dialog)
- Browser support required  
 - No backwards compatibility issues

Security is every developer's job

Developing with security awareness is a good start

- ▶ Every developer must know at least security basics
- ▶ One (senior) developer per team with deep security knowledge

Design security in from the beginning

- ▶ Think about security requirements before starting to code
- ▶ Much harder/ more expensive to secure an existing application

Security must be a natural part
of your development process

Resources

- OWASP www.owasp.org
- OWASP WebScarab https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Project with Firefox QuickProxy <https://addons.mozilla.org/de/firefox/addon/quickproxy>
- ESAPI <http://esapi.org>
- Java Secure Coding Guidelines <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/seccodeguide-139067.html>
- Qualys SSL Labs <https://www.ssllabs.com>
- Preventing CSRF with JSF 2.0 <http://blog.eisele.net/2011/02/preventing-csrf-with-jsf-20.html>
- HTTP Strict Transport Security Header <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec>



Secure coding...

Visit us at our booth for
more (security) questions...

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